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ANTICIPATING THE WISE LATINA JUDGE
PAT K. CHEWt
ABSTRACT
Sonia Sotomayor's famous "wise Latina" quote provoked a con-
servative critique. The first part of the critique proposes that Judge So-
tomayor's gender and racial background would affect her judicial deci-
sion making. The second part fears that her Latina background would
result in bias, prejudice, and unfair judicial decisions.
This Essay explores this conservative critique and discusses it more
generally. It reviews the realism model of judicial decision making, so-
cial science research on salience theory, and empirical research on judg-
es' race and gender-ultimately concluding that the first part of the con-
servative critique is correct: judges' gender and racial backgrounds affect
their decision making, at least in some cases. The Essay, however, dis-
cusses why the second part of the critique is problematic. It argues that
we should have the same positive associations, and the same anticipation
of judicial insights, about judges' gender and racial backgrounds that we
do about the other biographical details of judges' backgrounds. It sug-
gests that judges engaging in "deep analysis" of alternative gender and
racial perspectives would move them toward empathic understanding
rather than fear of bias, prejudice, and unfair results.
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INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obama nominated Sonia Sotomayor to the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2009.' She became the first Hispanic and only the third
female judge to serve on the Court.2 She was such an impressive candi-
date, credentialed in all the traditional ways,3 that you would think that
her appointment process would have been smooth sailing with no objec-
tions.
Instead, there were publicized attempts to derail her nomination.
4
This was prompted in part by Judge Sotomayor's now famous quote: "I
would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experienc-
es would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male
who hasn't lived that life."5 The language in this quote puts gender and
race front and center, given that, for instance, the term "Latina" indicates
both gender and race simultaneously.
There were a variety of responses to her statement. Some were sup-
portive.6 Others were critical, as illustrated by the strong conservative
reactions of Senator Jeff Sessions, the ranking Republican on the Senate
7Judiciary Committee. He interpreted her quote in the following way:
that her background and experiences as a Latina were indicative of her
potential bias and prejudice in judicial decision making, thereby suggest-
ing that she would not be suitable or qualified as a Supreme Court Jus-
tice.8 He feared that her personal preferences would prevail over a com-
mitment to upholding the law, thus resulting in unfair judicial decisions.
9
This conservative critique of the "wise Latina" quote can best be
understood by breaking it down into its two parts. The first part is the
belief that Judge Sotomayor's gender and racial background would affect
her judicial decision making. The second part is the fear that her gender
and racial background would affect her judicial decision-making process
I. Peter Hamby et al., Obama Nominates Sonia Sotomayor to Supreme Court, CNN (May
26, 2009, 20:27 EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/26/supreme.court.
2. Id.
3. She was educated at Princeton and Yale and was an experienced federal court judge. Id.
4. See Sen. Jeff Sessions Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to
Be an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, WASH. POST (July 14, 2009, 10:35 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/1 4 AR200907 14011 55.html (tran-
script of hearing).
5. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002); see
also Dana Bash & Emily Sherman, Sobomayor's 'Wise Latina' Comment a Staple of Her Speeches,
CNN (June 8, 2009, 13:39 EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/05/sotomayor.speeches/
(indicating Sotomayor's use of the phrase in other speeches).
6. Caitlin Taylor, Sotomayor's Controversial 2001 Remarks-and Their Context, ABC
NEWS (May 27, 2009, 8:46 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/05/sotomayors-cont.
7. See Sen. Jeff Sessions Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to
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negatively, namely that the effect would be bias, prejudice, and unfair
results.
This Essay explores this critique of the "wise Latina" quote in a
broader context. We consider the first part of the critique by reviewing
the realism model of judicial decision making, highlighting social sci-
ence research on the salience theory, and finally, discussing the empirical
research on judges' gender and race. Part II of the Essay explores the
second part of the critique, the problematic inference of judicial bias and
unfair results. Part III suggests a methodology of "deep analysis" to con-
sciously integrate the full array of judicial experience into judicial deci-
sion making.
1. CONFIRMING THAT GENDER AND RACIAL BACKGROUNDS MATTER
A. Realist Model of Judicial Decision Making
Described in dozens of books on legal reasoning, law students are
tutored in the basic lawyerly skills°: spotting the legal issues, identifying
the legal principles, determining the relevant facts, and applying the
principles to the facts to reach a legal conclusion. Students learn to use
judicial opinions and statutes to convince judges of their particular advo-
cacy position.
As law students learn, however, the process of judicial analysis and
decision making is not as cut and dry as it might first appear.1 Judges are
required to filter and interpret. Among other inquires, judges must ask
the following: Which are the appropriate legal principles? What do they
mean? Which are the believable facts, and of these, which are relevant
given the applicable legal inquiries? When parties disagree about the
facts-which almost always occurs-which version is the most persua-
sive and how is that determination made?
How do judges engage in this complicated and often nuanced pro-
cess of legal filtering and interpreting? Two models of judicial decision
making offer contrasting answers.12 The formalist model envisions these
processes of judicial filtering and interpreting as systematic and uniform-
ly executed.13 Judges meticulously utilize the appropriate legal formula
10. See, e.g., TERESA KISSANE BROSTOFF & ANN SINSHEIMER, UNITED STATES LEGAL
LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 77-211 (3d ed. 2013) (describing in detail for beginning students the
American legal system using cases, using statutes, synthesizing cases, and appellate advocacy); E.
SCOTT FRUEHWALD, THINK LIKE A LAWYER: LEGAL REASONING FOR LAW STUDENTS AND
BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS (2013) (similarly describing the fundamentals of basic legal reasoning).
11. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: IS PSYCHOLOGY
RELEVANT? (1999) (acknowledging and explaining further the complexity of judicial decision mak-
ing).
12. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19-56 (2008) (describing nine theories of
judicial behavior).
13. See Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism,
and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 420-21 (1992) (describing formal-
ist judges).
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for the dispute at hand, following the specified steps and ending up with
reasonably predictable results. The formalist model suggests there is little
opportunity for a judge's particular experiences and background to play a
role in his or her decision making, since judges have very few degrees of
freedom to exercise latitude in their interpretation. The process is pre-
sumed to be unambiguous and dictated; the "humanness" of judges is not
relevant.
As described by Judge Posner, the formalist model, what he labels
as "legalism," envisions the following:
The ideal legalist decision is the product of a syllogism in which a
rule of law supplies the major premise, the facts of the case supply
the minor one, and the decision is the conclusion. The rule might
have to be extracted from a statute or a constitutional provision, but
the legalist model comes complete with a set of rules of interpretation
(the "canons of construction"), so that interpretation too becomes a
rule-bound activity, purging judicial discretion.14
In contrast, a realist model of judicial decision making acknowledg-
es that judges are individuals who bring their background and life expe-
riences with them to the bench. When judges put on their formal robes
and enter the courtroom, they do not leave their gender, race, education,
religion, former occupations, and upbringing behind. 5 Their humanness
brings a contextual richness to their thinking. On the other hand, judges
also bring their stereotypes and cognitive biases. 16
Nonetheless, the realism model is not contrary to principled legal
analysis. Gibson and Caldeira explain that judicial "decisionmaking in-
volves far more than 'applying' the law to the facts in a mechanical or
14. POSNER, supra note 12, at 4 1.
15. As described by Judge Kozinski: "We all view reality from our own peculiar perspective;
we all have biases, interests, leanings, instincts." Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other
Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 115, 119
(David M. O'Brien ed., 4th ed. 2013).
16. Brest and Krieger, for instance, explain how common cognitive biases are found in the
legal context. PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING,
AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICY MAKERS 267-302 (2010). To
illustrate, people in general tend to be influenced by externally-given reference points in their deci-
sion making, what social scientists call the "anchoring and adjustment bias." Id. at 267. In one study
by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich:
[F]ederal judges [were given] the facts of a personal injury case, in which the plaintiff
had been hospitalized for several months and was left paraplegic and confined to a
wheelchair. One group was anchored by being informed that the defendant had moved for
dismissal on the ground that the case did not meet the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum
for a diversity case; the other group was given no such anchoring information. Though
almost none of the judges granted the motion to dismiss, the average award in the an-
chored group was $882,000 compared to $1,249,000 in the unanchored group.
Id. at 269 (footnote omitted).
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syllogistic fashion," and "inevitably involves and implicates judges' per-
sonal values."'7 At the same time, they observe:
[T]his is a matter of degree-to reject mechanical jurisprudence is
not necessarily to assume unfettered discretion but only to recognize
that, within the context of the rule of law, judges have choices in
their decisions and that their choices often if not typically reflect their
own ideological predispositions. 18
In practice, judges typically exercise discretion in a principled fash-
ion, not in a strategic self-interested way, thereby protecting judicial le-
gitimacy. They are not "merely politicians in robes."'9 Judge Kozinski
further notes that judges exercise discretion, but that discretion is con-
strained by judges' own self-respect, colleagues' oversight, and the polit-
ical process, including, in some jurisdictions, removal of judges by vot-
20ers.
B. Salience Theory
Salience theory, as studied by social scientists, is also consistent
with the realists' perception of judicial decision making. Salience theory
explains that when individuals are bombarded with lots of possible stim-
uli, for instance, myriad pieces of information, some stimuli stand out
more.2' These stimuli appear to garner the individual's attention and have
heightened relevance. That is, these pieces are more salient than other
pieces of information. For example, if you are thinking about buying a
new car, you will start noticing different car models and colors more than
under normal circumstances.
The concept of salience has been discussed in varied contexts.
Nisbett, a cultural psychologist, for instance, found that in study after
study East Asians and Americans responded in qualitatively different
22ways to the same situation. In one experiment, Japanese and Americans
viewed the same animated underwater scenes then reported what they
had seen:
The first statement by Americans usually referred to a large fish in
the foreground . . . . They would say something like, "There was
what looked like a trout swimming to the right." The first statement
by Japanese usually referred to background elements: "There was a
17. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of
the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 195, 201 (2011).
18. ld. at 214.
19. Id.
20. Kozinski, supra note 15, at 116-17.
21. See generally Duane M. Rumbaugh et al., A Salience Theory of Learning and Behavior:
With Perspectives on Neurobiology and Cognition, 28 INT'L J. PRIMATOLOGY 973 (2007) (providing
background information on salience theory).
22. RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: How ASIANS AND WESTERNERS
THINK DIFFERENTLY... AND WHY (2003).
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lake or a pond." The Japanese made about 70 percent more state-
ments than Americans about background aspects of the environment,
and 100 percent more statements about relationships with inanimate
aspects of the environment, for example, that a big fish swam past
some gray seaweed. 23
In other words, East Asians are more likely to attend to the whole, while
Westerners are more likely to focus on a particular object within the
whole.
Thus, we learn from Nisbett's work that our experiences and social-
ization shape our perceptions of the world. People from different back-
grounds pay attention to different things; that is, among the array of
pieces of information and stimuli that we could pay attention to, some
things are more salient than others.
Research in medicine provides another example of salience, or in
this case, the lack of it. Credentialed radiologists were asked to look at
five lung CT scans, each which contained about ten nodules or abnormal-
24 2ities. They were asked to click on anything strange on the scans . On
the final scan, a figure of a dancing gorilla about forty-eight times the
size of an average nodule was placed in the upper right hand quadrant.26
Twenty out of the twenty-four radiologists admitted they were unable to
see the gorilla even though they scrolled past it an average of 4.3 times
and twelve had looked directly at it.2 7 After being asked if they were able
to see the gorilla, the radiologists were shown the slide again and asked if
they saw anything unusual.28 They all were able to see the gorilla this
time,29 thus suggesting that individuals can be trained to find salient
stimuli that would otherwise not be noticed.
Thus, we learn from this study that training someone to be an expert
often means training them to pay particular attention to certain things. As
a consequence, however, the training may also result in these experts
ignoring other things, even when they are right before their eyes. This
tendency has been called "inattentional blindness."
30
23. See The Geography of Thought: How Culture Colors the Way the Mind Works, REGENTS
U. MICH. (Feb. 27, 2003), http://www.ns.umich.edu/Releases/2003/FebO3/rO22703a.html (internal
quotation marks omitted) (describing Nisbett's research).
24. Trafton Drew et al., The Invisible Gorilla Strikes Again: Sustained Inattentional Blindness
in Expert Observers, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1848, 1849 (2013).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1850.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1848.
[Vol. 91:4
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C. Empirical Research on Judges' Gender and Judges' Race
Substantial empirical research on judges' gender and race also indi-
cates that different backgrounds can affect judicial decision making, and




Consider this hypothetical: A judge hears a female employee's de-
tailed complaint of her supervisor's sexual harassment. Consistent with
applicable legal principles,32 her lawyers argue: (1) the harassment was
because of her sex; (2) the harassment was so "pervasive and severe" that
it created a "hostile work environment"; and (3) therefore the defendant's
actions were illegal. The judge then hears the supervisor and employer
argue that the plaintiff-employee has not established the legal require-
ments for sexual harassment. Instead, they posit that (1) if there was har-
assment, it was not because of her sex but attributable to something else;
(2) even if there was sexual harassment, it was not "severe or pervasive"
enough to create a "hostile work environment"; and (3) therefore their
conduct was not illegal.
How do judges analyze these arguments? Well-established case law
directs judges to ask: What would a reasonable person conclude?33 It
turns out that if we attach a gender to the reasonable person, you get dif-
ferent conclusions about whether a set of facts is perceived as sexual
harassment or not.34 The reasonable man and the reasonable woman do
not see eye to eye; they instead view what constitutes sexual harassment
with very different lenses.35 These findings suggest that the "reasonable
person standard" is more variable than the formalist model would indi-
cate, leaving the judge to essentially project his or her own beliefs onto
what is supposed to be some objectively-defined reference point.
Given the differences among men and women in general, the real-
ism model of judicial decision making would predict that female judges
and male judges also would differ in their perceptions of sexual harass-
ment and sexual discrimination. Indeed, the weight of empirical research
31. See, e.g., CASSIA SPOHN, How Do JUDGES DECIDE?: THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND
JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT 107-22 (2d ed. 2009) (describing research on the ffects of judges' race
and gender on outcomes in criminal law cases).
32. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (clarifying the elements of a
hostile environment claim); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(indicating that the harassment must be because of the protected status).
33. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite
Corp., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 260, 265 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 759 F.2d
355 (4th Cir. 1985).
34. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Reasonable Woman Standard.- A Meta-Analytic Review of
Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 33, 35 (1998);
Barbara A. Gutek & Maureen O'Connor, The Empirical Basis for the Reasonable Woman Standard,
51 J. Soc. ISSUES, no. 1, at 151, 154 (1995).
35. Gutek & O'Connor, supra note 34, at 155.
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on judges' gender supports that prediction.36 A review of fourteen studies
found that female judges in federal appellate courts have decision-
making patterns distinct from male judges in sexual discrimination cas-
es.3 7 Namely, female judges are more likely to hold for plaintiff employ-
ees, who are most likely women.38 In Peresie's study of sex discrimina-
tion and sexual harassment cases in the federal courts, she found that
female judges and male judges differed in their decision-making pat-
terns.39 Male judges held in favor of the plaintiffs 24% of the time; fe-
male judges held in favor of the plaintiffs 39% of the time.40 Another
study by Boyd, Epstein, and Martin also found that, when dealing with
sex discrimination suits, female judges found in favor of plaintiffs more
frequently than male judges.4' In fact, they conclude that the likelihood
of a plaintiff's success increases by about 10% if the judge is a woman.42
Thus, it appears that female judges had different perceptions than male
judges about what was salient; they saw things that male judges did not
see. Conversely, male judges apparently saw things that made them rule
more often in favor of the defendants.
2. Judges' Race
The realism model is also supported in empirical research on judg-
es' race. Again, let me offer a hypothetical similar to the gender-based
one above: A judge hears a black employee's detailed complaint of racial
harassment. As required by the applicable legal principles,4 3 his lawyers
argue that (1) the harassment was because of his race; (2) the harassment
was so "pervasive and severe" that it created a "hostile work environ-
ment"; and (3) therefore the defendants engaged in illegal conduct. The
judge then hears the supervisor and employer argue that the plaintiff has
not established the legal requirements for racial harassment. Instead, they
argue that (1) if there was harassment, it was not because of his race but
is attributable to a non-race-related reason; (2) even if there was racial
harassment, it was not "severe or pervasive" enough to create a "hostile
work environment"; and (3) therefore their actions were not illegal.
36. See Pat K. Chew, Judges' Gender and Employment Discrimination Cases: Emerging
Evidence-Based Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 359, 366 (2011).
37. Id. at 366; see also SALLY J. KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE
JUDICIARY REALLY MATTER 28 (2013) (reviewing research).
38. See Chew, supra note 36, at 366.
39. Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761 (2005).
40. Id. at 1769.
41. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of
Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 390-92 (2010).
42. Id. at 390.
43. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (clarifying the elements of a
hostile environment claim); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(indicating the harassment must be because of the protected status).
[Vol. 91:4
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The law again refers judges to the "reasonable person" in her or his
filtering and interpreting process.44 Yet if we attach a race to the reason-
able person, different conclusions result about whether racial discrimina-
tion has occurred.45 Thus, a reasonable African-American and a reasona-
ble white American may well have different reasonableness perceptions.
And again, consistent with the realism model, empirical research es-
tablishes that judges' race makes a difference in legal conclusions in
racial harassment cases.46 In two studies of federal district court cases,
Kelley and I found that judges of different races had distinct decision-
making patterns: African American judges held for plaintiffs 46% of the
time, Hispanic judges 19% of the time, and white judges 21% of the
time.47
Contrary to what a "monolithic minority judge" model would sug-
gest, African-American judges and Hispanic judges had significantly
different decision-making patterns, with African-American judges much
more likely to hold for plaintiffs than Hispanic judges (or judges of any
other racial group).48 In fact, when Hispanic judges are studied inde-
pendently of other minority judges, their decision-making pattern is more
similar to that of white judges.49 Furthermore, judges of every race, in-
cluding white judges, end up being more pro-plaintiff when the plaintiff
is of the same race.50 This finding suggests that judges of all races identi-
fy more readily with plaintiffs of the same racial background.
Thus, the empirical research indicates that there are cases where
judges' gender and race make a difference. For judges' gender, it in-
cludes sex discrimination and sexual harassment disputes; for judges'
race, it includes race discrimination and racial harassment disputes. An
explanation for these results, consistent with the realism model and sali-
ence theory, is that individuals of different genders and of different races
have different life experiences and these varied backgrounds affect how
they determine if sex discrimination or race discrimination has occurred.
44. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite
Corp., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 260, 265 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 759 F.2d
355 (4th Cir. 1985).
45. See, e.g., K.A. DIXON ET AL., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: How AMERICANS VIEW
DISCRIMINATION AND RACE ON THE JOB 1 (2002), available at
http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/iles/content/A Workplace Divided.pdf (indicating
that white workers are far more likely than minority workers to believe that everyone is treated fairly
at work).
46. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical
Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (2009) [hereinafter Chew &
Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge]; Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, The Realism of Race in
Judicial Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis of Plaintiffs' Race and Judges' Race, 28 HARV. J.
ON RACIAL& ETHNIC JUST. 91,91 (2012) [hereinafter Chew & Kelley, The Realism of Race].
47. Chew & Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge, supra note 46, at 1143; see also Chew &
Kelley, The Realism of Race, supra note 46, at 103-07.
48. Chew & Kelley, The Realism of Race, supra note 46, at 104.
49. Id. at 100.
50. Id. at 110.
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Note, however, that the judges' sex and race does not appear to
make a difference in all cases. For example, Kelley and I found that fe-
male and male judges did not have distinct decision-making patterns in
racial harassment cases.5' Boyd and her colleagues found no gender-
52related differences in twelve subject areas.
II. QUESTIONING THE FEAR OF BIAS
Recalling the conservative critique of the wise Latina quote, it ap-
pears that the first part of the critique is correct: that is, that Justice So-
tomayor and other judges' gender and racial backgrounds affect heir
decision making. As described in Part I of this Essay, the realism model
of judicial-decision-making, salience theory, and empirical research on
judges' gender and race all support that conclusion.
But now I want to shift gears and focus on the second part of the
conservative critique's logic, that is, the fear that Justice Sotomayor's
gender and racial background will lead to judicial bias, prejudice, and
unfair results. I think this second part of the conservative critique is prob-
lematic. If indeed bias exists in the judiciary, why would we be more
suspicious of a Latina judge than any other judge? Why not the male
judge? Why not the white judge? Indeed, why should we presumptively
accuse any of these judges of bias because of their gender or race?
Would this not be a form of gender or racial profiling? I know of no em-
pirical evidence that judges of a particular gender or race are more likely
than any other gender or race to ignore legal principles and instead sub-
stitute their own political or personal preferences.53
Let's try a "thought experiment." Judges have all kinds of back-
grounds and experiences. Here are some miscellaneous details from the
biographies of current and former judges:
Judge l's background: Father was a plant manager with Bethlehem
Steel; has adopted children; has had recurring seizures.
54
Judge 2's background: Has diabetes; former partner in a commercial
litigation law firm in Manhattan specializing in litigation against al-
leged counterfeiters of Fendi goods.55
51. Chew & Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge, supra note 46, at 1143 (showing that
plaintiffs are successful 26% of the time before female judges and 21% of the time before male
judges).
52. Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 41, at 390.
53. Unfortunately, there are judicial abuses of professional duties. We can all recall, for
instance, cases of judicial corruption, but the perpetrators are not disproportionately white or minori-
ty, male or female. As noted earlier, judges as a group are subject to cognitive biases, but again,
there is no evidence that these biases are more prevalent in one gender or race than in others. See
supra text accompanying note 16.
54. Todd S. Purdum, Jodi Wilgoren & Pam Belluck, Court Nominee's Life Is Rooted in Faith
and Respect for Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at Al; Michael D. Shear, Chief Justice Suffers
Seizure Roberts Is Fine, Spokeswoman Says, WASH. POST, July 31, 2007, at AO1.
55. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at Al.
[Vol. 9 1:4
ANTICIPATING THE WISE LATINA JUDGE
Judge 3's background: Served in naval intelligence as a code breaker;
started his own law firm specializing in antitrust law.
56
Judge 4's background: Grew up on a cattle ranch in Arizona; pre-
college education in a private all-girls school in El Paso, Texas;
spouse suffered from Alzheimer's for many years.57
My question to you: Will these judges' experiences affect their de-
cisions in cases where those experiences are relevant? For examples,
might Judges 1 and 2 draw from their own health care experiences when
analyzing a health care case? Or would Judge 3's experience in naval
intelligence affect his thinking in a case dealing with national security?
Or in a case dealing with property rights, might Judge 4 draw on her
background growing up in a ranching family?
Will these judges' backgrounds affect their decisions in cases where
their experiences are salient? Of course. So Judges 1 and 2, Justices Rob-
erts and Sotomayor respectively, would likely draw from their health
care experiences when analyzing a health care case. And Judge 3, former
Justice Stevens's experience in naval intelligence would inform his
thinking in a case dealing with national security. And Judge 4, former
Justice O'Connor, also might draw from her ranching experience in a
dispute over property rights. Thus, consistent with the first part of the
conservative critique, a judge's background may well play a role in her
or his decision making.
But here is a second question: Did these background details prompt
you to question the judges' commitment o following the law? Did you
fear that Justice Roberts or Justice Sotomayor, in deciding a case dealing
with health care laws, would act on their personal or political preferences
rather than adhere to established legal rules and precedents? Did you fear
that that Justice O'Connor would be biased in a case dealing with a
ranching-related dispute; or that Justice Stevens would be biased when
analyzing a case dealing with naval intelligence?
My guess is that you did not have those fears. As you considered
their backgrounds and their qualifications to be judges, I am guessing
that you viewed this information about their backgrounds neutrally. Or
perhaps you even associated their backgrounds and their judicial decision
making positively. Your reasoning would be that their backgrounds
might provide useful insights and particular attentiveness to cases where
their knowledge of the health care system, ranching, or military intelli-
56. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at
650.
57. Sandra Day O'Connor, THE OYEZ PROJECT,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/sandra day_oconnor (last visited Mar. 7, 2014); Adam Bernstein, John
J. O'Connor Il, 79; Husband of Supreme Court Justice, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/1 1  I/AR2009111119571 .html.
2014]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
gence would be salient. While their perceptions may vary from individu-
als without these particular experiences, you might plausibly assume that
their varied perceptions could enhance rather than corrupt the judicial
process; that they would be able to offer insights about the facts and legal
principles that others would be unable to offer, drawing from their back-
ground for more nuanced, better-informed, and fairer judicial decisions.
So if our reaction to this broad array of backgrounds is neutral, or
even positive, why not also think positively about individuals' gender
and racial backgrounds and perspectives? Why not similarly anticipate
that individuals of varied gender and racial backgrounds would offer
insights about the facts and legal principles in cases where their back-
ground is salient; that they can draw from their experiences so that there
are more nuanced, better-informed, fairer judicial decisions.
Based on my own experience in interactions with hundreds of judg-
es,58 1 think judges themselves illustrate a contrary impulse-an impulse
to view the worldviews of judges of other races as somehow biased or
faulty.
When presented with our empirical findings that judges of different
races have different decision-making patterns, judges sometimes have
both speculative and defensive reactions.
For example, some judges, who are often but not always white, are
on the defense. They argue that minority judges' legal conclusions must
be incorrect, while white judges' legal conclusions are correct.59 Their
implicit assumption is that white judges in racial harassment cases set the
standard; it is their interpretation of the law that should be the norm.
They presume that minority judges favor minority plaintiffs in unfair
ways or that minority judges' legal analysis is otherwise lacking. Perhaps
they are thinking that minority judges are affirmative action law students
who are presumptively not as skilled or intelligent as non-minority stu-
dents. Thus, that same inferior skill and intelligence makes them less
skilled and intelligent as judges.
A second group of judges, who are often but not always minority,
are also defensive. They argue that it is the white judges who are incor-
58. Among other events, I led workshops and was a featured speaker at the following: (1)
National Workshops for Federal Magistrate Judges, Federal Judiciary Center, Denver and Miami
(2012); (2) Annual Meeting of the National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Court
(May 2009); (3) ABA Midyear Presentation, Judicial Division and over twenty other sponsors
(2010). Also, I received dozens of comments from judges and others on articles describing my
research. E.g., Mike Green, Report: Race Matters in Judicial Decision-Making, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 13, 2010, 5:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-green/report-race-matters-in-
jub 461526.html; Edward A. Adams, Race & Gender of Judges Make Enormous Differences in
Rulings, Studies Find, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 6, 2010, 19:20 CDT),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/race gender ofjudges make enormous differences in ru
lings studies find aba/.
59. This is based on my experiences, described supra note 58.
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rect and the minority judges that are correct. They presume that white
judges are biased, perhaps unconsciously, against minority plaintiffs.
They assume that even in a post-Obama world, whites are still naive
about how discrimination occurs and how pervasive and impactful stere-
otyping continues to be. They believe that white judges, for instance, do
not see the subtle bias that pervades the workplace, and thus are less like-
ly to call harassment racially based or sufficiently serious to result in a
hostile workplace. Meanwhile, from their vantage point, minority judges
see and experience ongoing subtle bias and, therefore, find minority
plaintiffs' claims of it persuasive.
III. MOVING FORWARD
The challenge is how do we move forward from the conservative
critique and defensive positions that are not constructive? How do we
take advantage of the varied perspectives of all judges, of all genders, of
all races?
How do we move from Senator Sessions's fear that Justice So-
tomayor's Latina background will result in judicial bias, prejudice, and
unfair results to an alternative attitude? This alternative mindset is antici-
pation that her Latina background (and all the other details of her and
other judges' background) will result in judicial insight, more nuanced
understanding of facts and law, and therefore fairer results.
A. Deep Analysis
Drawing from anthropologists Avruch and Black's work on inter-
cultural conflicts, an approach they call "thick" 60 and I call "deep analy-
sis," appears particularly apt-at least as a starting point.
1. Acknowledge Opaqueness
"Acknowledging opaqueness" is the first of two steps in the deep
analysis process. Judges and others can begin by recognizing that there is
a range of legitimate perspectives distinct from their own. These alterna-
tive perspectives may not be immediately understandable or familiar.
Avruch and Black would describe these as "opaque" perspectives be-
cause, on their face, they do not seem comprehensible or correct.61 In
contrast, one's own perspective and those of individuals who share your
perspective are "transparent"; that is, they are readily understandable,
naturally sensible, and familiar to you. This transparency is particularly
reinforced if your perspective is also the norm.
60. See Kevin Avruch & Peter W. Black, Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Prob-
lems and Prospects, in THE CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER 7, 10 (Pat K. Chew ed., 2001) (inter-
nal quotation mark omitted).
61. Id. at9.
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Thus, for example, if you are a male judge who shares the reasona-
ble man's view of what constitutes sexual harassment, then you will nat-
urally interpret the facts in a sexual harassment claim in a way that is
sensible and familiar to you. In contrast, the view of a female judge who
shares the reasonable woman's view of sexual harassment will not make
much sense to you. It will be an unfamiliar and less comprehensible in-
terpretation of the facts; it will be opaque to you. As a male judge, your
own interpretation will be transparent and because it is also the norm, it
will be easy to be confident that your view is correct. Avruch and Black,
however, recommend that male judges begin by acknowledging there is
an alternative perspective and that it is opaque to them.62
2. Pause and Empathically Assess
Once one recognizes that there is an alternative perspective, Avruch
and Black suggest our first impulse is to dismiss these alternative views
because they are inconsistent with our worldview.63 Our inclination is to
reconcile differences in our worldview by comparing them to our set of
norms, values, and beliefs. If they do not match up, our tendency is to
dismiss or criticize them. Instead, Avruch and Black suggest you pause
and suspend any judgments.64 As Judge Kozinski suggests in describing
judicial decision making generally: allow yourself to doubt and question
your own impulses.
65
Instead of assuming that others holding alternative views are biased,
consider instead how novel perspectives may hold particularly valuable
insight to the issues at hand. Ask how these alternative worldviews might
expand your thinking and deepen your understanding of what is occur-
ring. In other words, think "deeply" about these alternative perspectives.
Try to understand the underlying assumptions and premises of the alter-
native view and how they might differ from your underlying assump-
tions.
Thus, male judges in sexual harassment cases should resist the im-
pulse to discount an alternative view offered by a "reasonable woman"
judge. Avoid or at least suspend a presumption of her prejudiced bias in
favor of one party in a way that is unfair and unmerited. Instead, they
should query what are the underlying assumptions of the alternative
view. What does the female judge find most salient and why does that
factor seem so relevant to her? If she is inclined toward a different legal
conclusion, empathically try to understand why. What insights can you
gain? That is, how does her perspective help you gain a more accurate
and meaningful understanding of the laws and of the facts? (Of course,
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Kozinski, supra note 15, at 119.
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female judges would do the same exercise when listening to their male
colleagues.)
While the above examples of deep analysis deal with male and fe-
male judges in sexual harassment cases, the same process could be ap-
plied to judges of different races in racial harassment cases. Thus, a
white judge can begin by acknowledging the legitimate alternative per-
spectives of black or Hispanic judges. Rather than immediately assuming
that their perspective is correct, white judges should pause to do a deep
analysis of the minority judge's worldview, empathically understanding
these alternative assumptions and saliences. Instead of framing the alter-
native worldview as bias, consider it as judicial insight. (Again, minority
judges should do the same.)
66
B. Evidence of Deep Analysis
This analysis of gender-related and race-related judicial saliences
may not be as abstract and impractical as one might think at first glance.
In fact, while they do not label the process as deep analysis, there is in-
ferential evidence that judges already engage in some version of this
collaborative and introspective process. In particular, the research on the
effect of mixed-gender and mixed-race judicial panels is telling.
Boyd and her colleagues found in their study of sex discrimination
cases that a male judge on an appellate panel was more likely to rule in
favor of a plaintiff if at least one female judge sat on the appellate pan-
el.67 The difference between all-male versus mixed-gender panels had
measurable consequences for litigants.
[The probability of an all-male panel] supporting the plaintiff in a sex
discrimination dispute never exceeds 0.20-not even for the most
liberal of male judges. But for mixed sex panels the probability never
falls below 0.20 for even the most conservative males. For males at
relatively average levels of ideology, the likelihood of a liberal, pro-
plaintiff vote increases by almost 85 percent when sitting with a fe-
male judge.
68
69Another example is Cox and Miles's study of voting rights cases.
They investigated whether the presence of an African-American judge on
a judicial panel affects the votes of his or her colleagues.70 They found
that it made a significant difference, with white judges more likely to
66. To take it a step further, even though white and Hispanic judges hold for the plaintiff with
similar frequency (21% and 19% respectively), white judges should not assume that Hispanic judges
reached their decision in a similar fashion (and vice versa). See supra note 47 and accompanying
text. Different facts or legal interpretations may have been salient to each group.
67. Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 41, at 406.
68. Chew, supra note 36, at 367.
69. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2008).
70. Id. at 34.
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vote in favor of liability when they sit with an African-American col-
league.71 The researchers theorized that white judges' view of the merits
of the case might change when they deliberate with African-American
colleagues who share their different experiences and information relating
to discriminatory practices.72
Thus, one explanation of these research findings is that when judi-
cial panels are confronted with facts and issues on which women or mi-
norities have particular insight, the panels pause to more deeply analyze
what is occurring. It would appear that male judges listen and are willing
to learn from the alternative perspectives of female judges, while white
judges are willing to learn from the alternative perspectives of black
judges. Moreover, it appears that jurists might decide a case differently
than they would have without this deep analysis of their varied perspec-
tives.
CONCLUSION
Conservative critics interpreted Justice Sotomayor's wise Latina
quote to mean two things: first, that her gender and racial background
would affect her judicial decision making; and second, that her back-
ground would affect her decision making negatively, namely that it
would lead to bias, prejudice, and unfair results. This Essay agrees with
the first part of the conservative critique and discusses it more broadly,
ultimately finding substantial support that judges' gender and racial
backgrounds do indeed affect their decision making in certain cases.
However, this Essay finds the second part of the conservative critique
problematic. It argues that we should anticipate that information about a
judge's gender and racial background should prompt a positive associa-
tion with judicial decision making, rather than a fear of bias and preju-
dice. Finally, the Essay suggests that judges engage in a deep analysis
when they encounter alternative perspectives from judges of other gen-
ders and races, thus anticipating constructive insights for the judicial
decision-making process.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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